Logic and Philosophy of Logic. Logics in Logic and Philosophy of Logic. Edit this record. Mark as duplicate. Find it on Scholar. Request removal from index.
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Configure custom resolver. Rational Episodes: Logic for the Intermittently Reasonable. Keith M. Parsons - - Prometheus Books.
Volker Peckhaus - - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5 4 Joe rated it really liked it Sep 16, Curly Joseph rated it liked it Oct 03, Arielle Harms rated it really liked it Jul 12, Rowan rated it did not like it Dec 02, Bookworm Adventure Girl rated it liked it Jan 13, Job rated it really liked it Dec 08, Anthony Haskin rated it liked it Mar 14, Emory Wolfe rated it it was amazing Apr 20, Aman rated it it was amazing Nov 27, Adrian Tormes rated it it was amazing Jan 08, Mimdala rated it really liked it Mar 11, Anne Harmon rated it liked it Sep 17, Thomas Weber rated it really liked it May 17, Machinephilosophy rated it it was amazing Apr 28, James Benson rated it really liked it Jan 06, Annemarie rated it it was amazing Jun 28, Sean rated it it was amazing Mar 20, Dallas Schiegg rated it it was amazing Dec 26, Dustin rated it it was ok Jun 20, John rated it liked it Sep 19, Jason Charewicz rated it really liked it Dec 26, Scott rated it liked it Oct 03, Lumumba Shakur marked it as to-read Apr 09, Mike marked it as to-read Mar 15, Jason marked it as to-read Dec 11, Joe added it Mar 18, Xiri marked it as to-read Sep 25, Alfiah Senta marked it as to-read Nov 14, Daph marked it as to-read Dec 22, A singular substance, for example, Paul, can be predicated of itself by a predication of identity, but not of another as of a subject.
The former we call k f others are found in him dental. Quantity Like all supreme genera or categories, quantity cannot be strictly defined, as we shall see when treating definition. We may, however, understand the category of quantity as the order of the homogeneous parts of a substance. Quantity accordingly divides into discrete and con- tinuous. Discrete quantity consists of actually distinct parts, as the units of a number, or one whole number as distinct from another.
Con- tinuous quantity is that whose parts are joined in some common term, as a line, surface, or solid. While a number is made up of parts constituting a single whole, a line is divisible into parts which are always divisible in their turn.
Quality Quality is an accident which determines a substance to be so and so, that is, to possess in more or less degree a distinctive attribute or char- acteristic. Quality comes from the form of a substance in contradistinc- tion to quantity, which comes from the matter of a substance. The great extent of the category of quality can be grasped best by indicating the four species of quality.
This type of quality designates a sub- stance as well or badly disposed, referring particularly to certain qualities of the mind.
If the habit is good in the sense of disposing a human substance well, then the habit is either an intellectual virtue, such as science, or a moral virtue, for example, justice or fortitude. If a habit badly disposes, then it becomes either something like error, or a moral vice such as dis- honesty or cowardice. Capacity is that sort of quality which is a proximate principle of operation, thereby disposing a substance for operation.
The various powers a substance has, for example, intellectual, moral, physical, are capacities enabling a substance to act— hence the potency or the ability to think, to will, and to see. An incapacity is a deficiency in some power, such as being feeble-minded, having weak vision, or being unable to lift a weight- c Sense qualities. Such qualities, affecting our powers of sensation, are perhaps the most obvious types of quality.
All colors, for example. Figure limits the quantity of substance to a "i. Relatioji thing to another. Where As the category When has a reference to time so the category Where has a reference to place. Here again, however, what we predicate in relation to a subject is precisely where a substance is. Accordingly, a substance may remain where it is but have a different order of its parts, that is assume different positions, as sitting, kneeling, leaning, or sprawled out. Note that such verbs do not express action or movement going on and hence the category of action but a posture assumed.
Action is required to assume a position, but the position as assumed is not action going on. Habit The name of this last category unfortunately is almost equiv- ocal. It does not mean here the species of quality we described above— which refers to mental and moral habits. This category therefore sets off man distinctively from other animals which have by nature feathers or hooves what man provides for himself by the invention of reason.
This category also extends to the wearing of ornaments and armaments. Ex- amples of this category, then, arc wearing a hat, being bcjeweled, being armed. In other words, in virtue of seeing where natures go in the categories, we notice tliat one nature becomes opposed to another, and thus opposition arises between natures when categorized.
Hence theTatt thVnUn? Contradictory opposition hind of opposition. Tlius we speak of a privative opposition between hearing and deaf- ness with reference to the ear. We thus see how this type of opposition is restricted in comparison to contradictory opposition.
We can only speak of privative opposition when we refer to a denial of a characteristic which should be present in a subject naturally capable of having that characteristic. Thus we can speak of a lack of courtesy with reference to someone who can and should have this quality. Contrary opposition Contrary opposition is an opposition between two positive terms signifying extremes of difference within the same genus, each of which excludes the other from the same subject It is therefore an opposition of being and being, in the same subject.
Contrary opposition may be under- stood as improper privation, since one contrary implies the privation of the other, but the privation is only an incapacity of a subject's having both contraries at the same time.
There is therefore less incapacity and less opposition than in privative opposition. Odd and even, for example, are contraries in the subject of number; both are positive terms and yet one implies the privation of the other. Further, every number is either odd or even and there is nothing in between. However, not all contrary opposites are without some intermediary in the way odd and even are without an intermediary.
White and black, understood as extremes of difference with respect to color, have the inter- mediate of grey or, in a broader sense, many intermediates of different kinds of color.
Expbin the category of subsl "j natures in the categoriesi m this category. Explain briefly each nf n,- 7. Jf a word does not signify something that can be placed in any category, or not in any one category, leave the line opposite it Idank. If no kind of opposition is realized, leave the line blank. Christian— non-Christian 2. Moreover, when we study the different sciences, we need to divide the subject of the science which is at first only vaguely known.
For instance, geometry deals with the continuum, which we can divide into line, surface and body, thereby achieving more distinct knowledge of what the science is about. Or again, the subject of natural science is changeable beings which is divided into living and non-living, and living in turn into animal and plant, and so on. We have seen in the preceding chapter that the categories constitute the highest genera in which we can put the natures we know. The modes of opposition, which we also treated there, are useful for dividing these genera because, as we shall see, the members of a division should be opposed to each other.
It is evident, therefore, that relating and oppos- ing natures to each other within a category is a result of division. Thus, within the category of substance we can divide substance into corporeal and non-corporeal by opposing the parts in a contradictory manner. We can further divide corporeal into living and non-living; living in turn into animal and non-animal; animal into vertebrate and non-vertebrate.
We can then change our mode of opposition and divide vertebrate into mammal, reptile, bird and fish. In this way we see how the logical process of division is a way of making more manifest an object somehow already known; division is therefore nothing else than the distributing of some whole into its parts.
The great philosophers have often employed the art of logical division as a means of knowing both one object as distinct from another and also what is included under one object and not under another. Aristotie in his ssnrk On the Soul disides die soul according to its possets into nutritis-e, appetitive, sensoy, locomotise and intellective. Thus we divide animal into the species man and brute, or we could divide color into its various species or kinds. The division of a genus into its species is, as we shall see shortly, only one kind of division, only one way of dividing a whole into its parts.
Whatever the kind of division, however, the rule still holds that each dividing member must be less than the whole divided. The dividing parts must exhaust, that is, fully and adequately divide, some object This rule is easy to understand but often hard to apply. The relevance of the rule is, of course, obvious, for not to give all the dividing members is in effect to miss the whole point of making a division as a means of knowing an object adequately.
For example, we have an ade- quate grasp of predicable, as far as division is concerned, only when we know it has the five dividing members of genus, species, specific dif- ference, property, and accident. This is an exhaustive division, for there are no other possible ways of saying one thing of another. On the other hand, to divide flower into rose, tulip, and lily would violate this rule and leave us with an inadequate grasp of flower.
The difficulty of applying this rule arises with the example of trying to divide flower into its various kinds. Who, indeed, could make an ex- haustive division of flower in this way?
This difficulty, nevertheless, can- not permit us to avoid observing this rule. Fortunately, the two succeed- ing rules will enable us to see how we can avoid the difficulty this rule raises. For the moment, let us note that in order not to violate the rule we should avoid trying to make a division which commits us to too many dividing parts, or leads us into trying to divide an object when we do not know sufficiently what the dividing parts are. A corollary of this rule is that any division must have at least two di- viding members.
Since what is divided must be a whole of some kind, then at least two parts will have to appear as dividing members. No doubt, no one would ever suppose that a division could only have one dividing member, but in the application of division to outlining, a single dividing member is sometimes given, possibly because one overlooks the fact that outlining is an application of logical division.
The dividing members must be formally opposed to each other such that each part excludes the other. We see, first of all, the relevance of this rule for a good division. If a division results in something being in one dividing member which is 52 DIVISION also in another, we have failed to set off distinctly the parts of the w'hole we are dividing. If, for example, we divide vertebrate into mammal, bird, reptile, fish, and canine, we commit the fallacy of an overlapping division since canine as a dividing part is already included under mammal.
To this Kne o! One and the same basis must be kept throughout the division. A basis of division is the foundation or the point of view taken in making a division. It is the consideration we have in mind in making a division, which may not be explicitly stated but which is revealed by the dividing members we select.
Any division of a genus into its species, as in the division of color into the various kinds of color or tree into the various kinds of tree presupposes having in mind an essential considera- tion of an object.
On tlie other hand, we may have in mind a more accidental consideration, as the division of man according to color or a division of book according to size. Often in outlining, we explicitly state the basis for making a division. Tlius in outlining the program of a political party, we may state as I under this topic, the tariff policy, with further division; then II, the foreign policy, with further division, and so on. Consequently logic, as an instrument of science, will insist that: a we do not shift the basis of division in a given division, b we do not shift the kind of division in one order of divisions, and c as far as possible we keep the same basis of division in a series of divisions and subdivisions.
In this connection, however, we must distinguish between division and co-division. A co-division consists in dividing an object completely according to one basis and then in another division dividing the same object according to another basis of division. Thus we can divide government in one way according to its different kinds, and then in a different division divide government ac- cording to its various powers.
In an outline form, the distinct bases of division are often explicitly stated, as in the example of outlining the program of a political party on the basis of its tariff policy and then on the basis of its foreign policy. We must also take into account the distinction between a division and a subdivision. A subdivision is simply a division made of a dividing mem- ber of a division.
Thus we can divide automobile the complexity of an artificial object does not preclude its being divided or defined according to various price ranges and then, under the medium price range, divide into different kinds or makes which, incidentally, are not singulars. Here we have gone from one point of view in the main division to a different point of view in the subdivision.
It is preferable, however, to 54 DIVISION keep the same basis of division when passing from the main division to a subdivision, especially when employing division in a science. But some- times, as in the example just given, and when we are not treating a matter scientifically, we can take a different basis for dividing a dividing member. In treating division so far, we have tended to emphasize division in terms of the most perfect kind, the division of a genus into its species.
The other kinds of division, though less perfect from the standpoint of the notion of logical division, are nonetheless extremely useful and perhaps more familiar to us. Division oj an integral whole into its composing parts of part. Thus we can divide government into executive, legislative, and judiciary parts each of which is necessary for the full and adequate operation of govern- ment.
Consequently, in a division of an integral whole into its composing parts, we cannot predicate the whole of any of its parts. We cannot say that the executive is the government as though realizing the very nature of government.
Rather, the executive needs to be completed by the com- plementary legislative and judiciary parts, that is, functions, of govern- ment. Division of a whole accidentally into its parts In general, an accidental division divides a whole on the basis of something that is neither essential nor integral to that whole. To say that a division is accidental is not to suggest that such a division is un- important. An accidental division is often useful and revealing as well as important; moreover, it is the type of division most frequently used.
The different kinds of accidental division will bring out the different ways an object can be divided in an accidental way. Most of the time this division consists in dividing something in the category of substance on the basis of some other category. Thus, we can divide man on the basis of quantity into size or weight, or on the basis of quality into differences of color or moral quality.
This type of accidental division is the reverse of the preceding one. For example, we can divide sensation in the category of quality according to the sub- jects in which-it is found, into man and brute animal. At first sight, such a division might seem I«s important or less useful since it is even more accidental than the foregoing ones.
Thus we can divide art in the category of quality according to the category of Wheti into ancient, medieval, and modern; we can divide something in the category of action according to relation into fast and slow; we can divide a quality, for example, intelligence, according to quantitative measurement, and so on. Show how division is related to the modes of opposition and to the categories.
Explain the relation between division and outlining. Explain the meaning and importance of the first rule of division. What precaution do we have to bear in mind with respect to the second rule of division? If bad, explain why.
Note that each item should include both the dividing parts and that which is divided, though not in any given order. Chicago, north, south, east, west 8.
German, Frencli, Spanish, Latin, romance language 9. Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, religion, non-Jewish 1 1. The fourth possibility is left open as a choice. This exercise may be done in outline form. Animal 2. American government 3. On a separate sheet of paper reproduce the division given in the following passage abbreviated in part : Stranger.
Let us begin by asking whether an angler is a man having art or not having art, but some other power. He is clearly a man of art Sfr. And of arts there are two kinds? What are they? All arts are either acquisitive or creative; in which class shall we place the art of the angler? Clearly in the acquisitive class. That is implied in what has been said. And may not conquest be again subdivided?
Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting? And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be further divided: into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey. Yes, if both kinds exist. Of course they exist; but the hunting after lifeless things having no special name, except some sorts of diving, and other small matters, may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting.
And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land-animal hunting and water-animal hunting, or the hunting after animals who swim? And of swimming animals, one class liyes on the wing and the other in the water? Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is included.
The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general name of fishing. And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two prin- cipal kinds? Wliat do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?
Yes, that is the term. Yes, it is often called so. What is the right name of that it Thcaet. We have referred before to this culminating effect of definition in relation to apprehending simple objects, but it may be desirable now to summarize what we have so far covered in relation to the art of definition.
Strictly speak- ing, we do not in logic seek to define words even though perforce we must use words ; we seek to define what words, through concepts, refer to, the real natures we come to know. In brief, we must address ourselves to the task of defining what the natures ate of things we know through experience; we are not merely substituting one word for another or one set of conventional signs for words we seek to know. The predicables move us on toward the task of constructing a defini- tion.
To be precise, further, about the simple apprehension of things signified by words, we benefit by knowing the categories, those ultimate genera in which we can locate any object that we can define. Finally, we can employ the art of division as a means of knowing, since within any category we can divide and thus determine the nearest genus, or at least a near genus, which affords us the best opportunity for start- ing to construct the definition that will provide us with a full explana- tion of the object we seek to know.
True enough, the content of any definition we give will not come from ogic, as we ave pointed out before, but from knowledge gained from many sciences we come to. If we can to set it apart from anv nrtn.
Indicate the kind of definition you are using. A composite expression speech cm ftereKCa" LCs? Tlic cnunciativc mode of expression which characterizes the proposition brings out clearly what the definition of the proposition is stating— an enunciating of wliat is tnic or false. Again, we have a grammatical equivalent for the proposition, the declarative sentence. The Elements of a Proposition Tlic elements of a proposition arc the name and the verb. We speah of a name in logic rather than a noun, for under name we include not only the noun, but the adjective and pronoun as well.
We shall shortly see precisely what we mean by the verb in logic. The division of a proposition into name and verb is a division of an integral whole into its composing parts; this type of division implies that for the completeness of a proposition both the name and the verb must be included. A name is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, no part of which is significant separately. Vocal sound is given as the genus in the definition.
The point of stating vocal sound as the genus, however, is to distinguish a name from any non-vocal sound that still might signify in some way, as the sound of thunder signi- fies an approaching storm. The remainder of the definition is made up of four distinguishing char- acteristics constituting the difference of the definition. By convention differentiates the name from vocal sounds that signify naturally, such as the groans or screams of a person in distress.
Without time differentiates the name from the verb in the sense that a name signifies something not measured by time. The verb, on the other hand, signifies with time, since it signifies motion, either coming from an agent or received in a patient, and time is the measure of this motion.
The name does not signify what is in motion, although what the name signifies is subject to motion. Thus the name man signifies what is subject to motion, but not motion going on, and in this sense the name signifies without time. The last part of the difference given in the defini- tion, no part of which is significant separately, differentiates the name from any composite expression, for example, wise man, in which the parts of a whole do signify something separately.
This definition expresses only what distinguishes the verb from the name; in other respects, the definitions or name and verb agree, for example, having the same genus, vowi sound.
As we noted above in the definition of a name, to signify with time means the following; since motion, both active and passive, is measured first and principally by time, the verb, which signifies this active and passive morion, signifies with time. We stress with, because time, taken absolutely, is signified by a name, such as time, year or day. To be even more precise, we must also say that the verb, in signifying with time, must signify in the mode of action, and not simply action itself.
For example, in the proposition "Walking is good exercise, "walking" signifies action itself but not action going on, and hence signifies as a name and not as a verb. Thus what is formal about the verb is its signifying with time in the sense of signifying action going on which is measured by time.
Because the subject of a proposition always signifies that in which something in- heres, the verb signifying in the manner of an action, whose nature is to inhere is posited on the part of the predicate of the proposition. Hence it is that the verb always signifies a predication; further, by means of the verb we imply or connote the composition or separation of subject and predicate.
We may also speak of the parts of a proposition as the subject, the predicate, and the verb copula. The clearest way to express these parts in a proposition is to use the present tense of the verb to be for the verb copula, as we just did in "White is a cdIdt.
Thus, is as a verb copula means to be in, not to be absolutely; m other words, the verb copula signifies first of all a mode of inherence, not a mode of simple existence, except in a proposition like P aul is, where it signifies in both ways. It IS not necessary that a proposition be expressed in this explicit way. Explain how truth is in the proposition, and how it is in the mind.
Explain the meaning of composite expression or speech. List the different hinds of perfect composite expression, explaining each and illustrating with an original example. What hind of division is used in dividing the proposition into name and verb, and why is it that hind of division? Define name, giving a brief explanation of the parts of the definition. Precisely how docs the verb differ from the name?
Explain the relation of the verb to time. Analyze a proposition according to subject, predicate, and copula, using an original example.
Given this meaning, is the proposition Shakespeare is a great poet true? Exercise Chapter Seven In the following composite expressions, mite Yes if the composite expression is a proposition, No if it is not In those that are propositions, underline the subject once and the predicate t;vice.
Every rose is "beautiful. Malee the world safe for democracy. I am hopeful. Hand me the book. Some sentences are not propositions. Give me your word of honor. Some books which are not novels are interesting. Anyone who thinks he is clever is not clever. Logic is a course that is needed for other studies. The building that is on the opposite side of the street is not the one you are to enter. The question is whether we should pass the motion or not.
O, that I might study logic forcN'erl That he cannot follow instructions is a liability. Henry is taller than George. The different kinds of proposition are established according to various bases of division, and result in co-divisions of the proposition. According to Unity The unity of a proposition is determined on the basis of the type of unity expressed by the mind in forming a proposition. Such a unity is either absolute or relative.
A proposition is absolutely one when it signifies one thing said un- qualifiedly of one other. Such a proposition is called a categorical proposi- tion.
Thus, Every rufionel animal is capable of learning grammar is a categorical proposition despite a multi- plicity of words. A proposition is relatively one when it signifies a composition which is one by conjunction. Such a proposition is called compound some- times hjpothctical in that it signifies two or more propositions joined together by some connective expression.
For the present, we can take as an example a conditional tj'pc of compound proposition: If man is rational, then man is able to make works of art. Such a proposition does not have simple unity of composi- tion in the mind, but only qualihcd unity, for it combines what is many into a qualified unity.
The Mtegorical and the compound proposition differ in two other pnncipal respects— according to a difference of the parts each proposi- tion has, and according to a difference of type of copula.
The parts of the rategoncal proposition, as we saw in the last chapter, are the name and the verb, pressed also as the subject, predicate, and verb copula. According to Quality and negative. The proposi- of "dog. Let us categoncal proposition, since the divi. Tlius tlie proposition If man is not rational, then man is not gram- matical is an affirmative compound proposition because the connective joins categorical propositions into one whole even though the categorical propositions are both negative in this instance.
In categorical propositions, it is always the verb copula which de- termines whether the proposition is affirmative or negative. This precision must be borne in mind because a categorical proposition can contain more than one verb, but only one of the verbs can function as the copula, that is, as a sign of combining or separating a logical predicate from a logical subject.
Thus Non-citizens are ineligible to vote is an affirmative proposition despite the negative expressions in it, neither of which affects the verb copula.
According to Quantity The basis for this division of the proposition is the quantity of the subject of the proposition; whatever the quantity of the subject of the proposition, the quantity of the proposition is as a whole.
We have already distinguished words as signifying what is singular or what is universal. In the logical sense of the term distinct from the grammatical sense the singular is that which is not of such a nature as to be predicable of many, but is said only of itself. We express the singular by a proper name, like Paul, or by some designating phrase, such as, this man. Accordingly, a singular proposition will have a singular sub- ject of which something is either being affirmed, as in Paul is intelli- gent, or is being denied, as in This man is not honest.
The universal is that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many. The division between universal and singular is therefore an ex- haustive one, since everything we know either can or cannot be predi- cated of many.
However, when what is universal is the subject of a proposition, then something in turn can be predicated of this universal in three distinct ways. First of all, something can be predicated of a universal subject uni- vcrsally.
Next, something can be predicated of a universal subject particularly. A particular proposition, therefore, is a proposition whose subject stands for a vague individual, as in Some man is wise, and Some man is not wise, or as standing for more than one but not all in a universal sense, as in Some men are wise, Some men are not wise. Finally, something can be predicated of a universal subject without a modifying quantitative sign, that is, indefinitely.
However a fev "i? In this connection if iT. Too often propositions are regarded mechanically and carelessly; for example, one can sup- pose that a proposition like Every rose is not red is universal because one fails to understand carefully just what the proposition is expressing, which in this instance is not that no rose is red, but that not every rose is red.
According to the Matter of the Proposition This division of the proposition is based on what the words signify with respect to the relation of the predicate and subject.
True enough, the knowledge we acquire of real objects is beyond the reach of logic itself, but nonetheless certain determinations on the part of what is signified in a proposition are the concern of logic. The follow- ing distinctions are instances of such determinations.
A proposition has necessary matter when the predicate is in the sub- ject per se, that is, when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject and is therefore related necessarily to the subject. A proposition has impossible matter when the predicate is per se repugnant to the subject, that is, when the subject and predicate are necessarily incompatible with each other.
The doctrine on the predicablcs is helpful in distinguishing what kind of matter is in propositions. If the predicate of a proposition is said as the predicablc accident, then the predicate is in contingent matter in relation to the subject. If a predicate cannot be related to any predicablc, then the predicate is in impossible matter, that is, it cannot be related to the subject.
According as the Mode of Composition is Expressed or Not This division of the proposition is based on whether or not the modality of a proposition is explicitly expressed. A simple proposition also called de inesse is one that does not ex- press explicitly the mode of composition in the proposition. It is this type of proposition that we have been considering so far in this chapter. A modal proposition is one in which the verb copula is modified by a sign indicating in what mode the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject.
There are four modes that can be expressed in a proposi- tion: necessity, impossibility, possibility, and contingency. Let us consider the proposition Man is grammatical. The dictum. Mrt "r. Tlie contingent is thus opposed to the necessary. It is sometimes important to express a proposition modally in order to bring out distinctions which would otherwise be ignored or lost.
Some difficulties arise in making some propositions explicitly modal and in opposing modal propositions to each other, but these considerations are beyond the scope of an elementary text in logic. When does a proposition have an absolute unity of composition? When does a proposition have a relative unity of composition? Explain the two other principal respects in which the categorical and compound propositions differ.
Why is the division of the proposition according to quality the essential kind of division? Distinguish clearly between the affirmative and the negative proposition, using original examples. Wliat must be negated in order that a proposition be negative? Show with original examples how certain propositions might seem to be nega- tive when they are affirmative and affirmative when they are negative. What is the basis of division of the proposition according to quantity?
What is the difference between singular and universal? Explain what is meant by predicating something of a universal subject universally, indefinitely, and particularly, using original examples. Explain what is meant by a proposition in necessary, impossible, and contingent matter, supplying original examples of each.
Distinguish the mode from the dictum in a modal proposition. What makes a modal proposition affirmative or negative? Distinguish the difference between the modes of contingency and pos- sibility.
Note carefully how the predicate is being enunciated of the subject according to the analysis given in the chapter, that is, how the predicate is said of the subject quantitatively. Every horse is an animal.
Some man is not honest. George is an able-bodied citizen. Not every flower is beautiful. No event in history is totally unimportant. Any man is capable of humor. Every logic text is not infallible. Man is gullible.
Whoever pays his debts is trustworthy. Sometimes winters are mild. Pink cows puzzle sober men. Some persons are non-voters. This student is conscientious. Not all who have the appearance of wisdom are wise.
Every indeflnite proposition is not ambiguous. One out of every four drivers exceeds speed limits. One who is industrious works conscientiously. One man is not Uic same as another.
Man is capable of cooking food. A circle is square. Animals sweat. Apples arc red. A sinner is a saint. Not all men are courageous. Grass is green. The diagonal of a square is commensurable with its side.
Man dies.
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